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Abstract 
We describe a calculus that is specific to non-repudiation 
protocols. The calculus uses the correspondence assertion 
of Woo and Lam, that is, if there is a non-repudiation of 
receipt there should be a corresponding non-repudiation of 
origin. The main contribution of this work lies in the way 
we  model  input  and  output  and  hence  captures  non-
repudiation properties. The calculus is a subset of the Pi 
calculus.  The  basic  constructs  are  modified  in  order  to 
handle properties of non-repudiation. We offer a formal 
syntax and an operational semantics of the calculus. We 
show the  usefulness of the calculus by  describing Zhou 
optimistic protocol. 
Keywords:  Non  repudiation  protocols,  Pi  calculus, 
operational semantics. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
One  of  the main  concerns  in  e-business,  in all  its 
different  forms  such  as  B2B,  B2C,  E2C,  is  fair 
exchange  of  services.  In  simple  terms  this  is 
concerned how to ensure fairness between parties. In 
that,  there  is  no  denial  by  one  of  the  entities  of 
having  participated  in  all  or  part  of  an  electronic 
transaction. For example, suppose that a business A 
instructs its bank to carry out some money transfer 
to  a  particular  account.  The  bank  executes  the 
instruction requested by A. Later, A denies that he 
has  sent  a  message  for  debiting  money  to  that 
particular  account.  To  avoid  such  denials  the 
following non-repudiation services are required: 
 
￿  Non-Repudiation  of  Origin  (NRO)  is 
intended  to  protect  against  the  originator 
rejection or denial of having sent a message 
to the recipient. 
￿  Non-Repudiation  of  Receipt  (NRR)  is 
intended  to  protect  against  the  recipient 
rejection  or  denial  of  having  received  the 
message from the originator. 
 
Non-repudiation  protocols  rely,  usually,  on  a 
Trusted Third Party (TTP). All the parties involved 
in the transacting process trust the TTP. Any dispute 
will  be  resolved  via  this  TTP.  The  trend  in  these 
protocols is that they try to minimise its use during a 
protocol  run.  Protocols,  which  do  not  respect  this 
issue,  however,  will  end  up  with  a  bottleneck 
problem.  There  are  protocols,  which  eliminate  the 
use of TTP altogether. The approach adopted in this 
latter case is a probabilistic one [1], [2]. An intensive 
survey  of  fair  non  repudiation  protocols  can  be 
found in [3]. 
 
We  describe  a  calculus  which  is  specific  to  non-
repudiation protocols. We are interested in the more 
general  protocols  and  which  involve  the  use  of  a 
TTP.  The  calculus  is  a  sub  set  of  the  Pi  calculus 
enriched  with  some  primitives  to  handle  non-
repudiation properties. We use the technique of Woo 
and Lam [4] of the correspondence assertion in the 
sense that for every received NRR there must exists 
a corresponding NRO. The main contribution of this 
work lies in the way we model input and output and 
hence captures non-repudiation properties. 
 
The  sequel  is  organised  as  follows.  In  the  next 
section we describe the calculus along with a brief 
introduction  to  the  Pi  calculus.  In  this  section  we 
provide the syntax and an operational semantics of 
the  calculus.  Section  3  illustrates  the  use  of  the 
calculus with an example. Related work is given in 
section 4 while section 5 concludes the paper.  
 
2. The Calculus 
 
The calculus is a subset of the Pi calculus [5] where 
we  modified  some  of  the  primitive  constructs  to 
handle  non-repudiation  of  origin  and  non-
repudiation of receipt.  
 
2.1. Pi Calculus Overview 
 
The Pi calculus is in essence a process algebra where 
processes  interact  by  sending  data  and  channel 
names. The basic computational step is the transfer 
of  a  communication  link  between  two  processes. 
The following example illustrates this idea [6]. We 
have  a  client  which  wants  to  use  the  printer.  The 
access to the printer is via the server. We have two 
channel of communication a and b. The channel a is 
used as an output channel from the server and the 
printer. The b channel can be used either direction 
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between  the  server  and  the  client.  Fig.  1  below 
shows this scenario. 
 
 
                         b       
 
          a 
         
 
 
  
 
Fig.1:  Before  interaction  between  the  server  and 
client 
 
There are three processes: S for the server, C for the 
client and P for the printer. There are two channels a 
and  b  as  we  mentioned  earlier.  This  state  can  be 
written in the Pi calculus as follows: 
 
ba.S | b(m).md.C      (1) 
 
This  expression  state  that  the server  will  send  the 
link a through the channel b and then behave like S. 
The client C is using the channel b as input where m 
is a place holder for the input received. The received 
input,  which  is  the  channel  a,  is  then  used  as  an 
output channel to send data d. The symbol | is used 
to  mean  parallel  composition,  that  is,  the  two 
processes  S  and  C  are  running  in  parallel  and 
communicating via the channel b. 
 
After the interaction between the processes S and C 
we have the following expression: 
 
  S | ad.C      (2) 
  
That is, the channel a is being used by C to send its 
data to the printer.  
 
Combining  the  two  expressions  (1)  and  (2)  the 
interaction  between  the  server  and  client  can  be 
formulated as follows: 
 
ba.S | b(m).md.C                      S | ad.C  
 
Fig. 2 below shows now the new channel between 
the client and the printer. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                         b 
 
                                a 
                   
 
 
 
Fig.2: After interaction between the server and client 
 
It should be noted that there are many variants of the 
Pi calculus which deal with specific area like the SPI 
calculus  [7]  and  the  Ambient  calculus  [8].  SPI 
calculus is used for modeling and analysing security 
protocols and the Ambient calculus is used to model 
and analyse mobile code. 
  
The  Pi  calculus,  as  it  is,  cannot  model  non-
repudiation of origin (NRO) and non-repudiation of 
receipt  (NRR).  It  would  be  simpler;  however,  to 
modify the calculus to handle these specific issues 
elegantly  rather  than  to  model  these  with  Pi  core 
primitives  and  end  up  with  what  it  might  be  a 
cumbersome description. 
 
In order to make the calculus simple we use a biadic 
calculus rather than a polyadic one. We believe this 
will suffice to describe non-repudiation protocols, as 
it is usually the case that in this type of protocols 
there are two major elements of interest: the message 
and the non-repudiation service. 
 
The framework in which the calculus should operate 
is  that  the  evidence  of  non-repudiation,  especially 
NRR,  is  generated  by  the  protocol  automatically 
rather than by the user. To this end, we use digital 
signatures to offer these services, as it is customary 
in these types of protocols. To accomplish this need, 
we  suppose  the  availability,  to  a  protocol,  the 
followings: the participating agent identification and 
his private key. In addition, the generated signature 
makes use of the notion of a session of a protocol 
run. Thus, a digital signature is a tuple of the form: 
(typ, Id, K, α).  
 
Where: 
 
Typ: is the type of the signature: {nro, nrr, sub, con} 
Id: the identification of the agent 
K: private key of the agent 
α:  the session of a protocol run 
 
We distinguish two types of digital signatures: the 
ones, which require non-repudiation of services, and 
the ones, which do not require such services. 
printer 
client  server 
server  client 
printer 
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The  verification  of  a  received  digital  signature 
represented  by  a  NRO  or  NRR  is  assumed  to  be 
possible by  each agent participating in a protocol. 
The  type  of  communication  between  agents  is 
asynchronous  as  we  anticipate  that  an  agent  who 
performed a send/receive will not stay idle waiting 
for a response from the other agent.  
 
2.2 Syntax 
 
Let  N  be a  set  of  names  denoting  communication 
actions  and  variables.  Let  τ  be  an  internal  action 
capable of being executed by any agent if he wishes 
to. Let A be a set of agent names, T a set of TTPs 
names and D a set of digital signatures. As stated 
earlier, two types of digital signatures are envisaged: 
those which require non-repudiation of services on 
one hand and those which they don't require on the 
other hand. We let the first type ranges over {nro, 
nrr}  and  the  second  type  ranges  over  {con,  sub}. 
The syntax is summarised in Table 1. 
 
                                Table 1: Syntax 
 
   
An informal  explanation  of  the  different  operators 
might be useful.  
 
￿  0 is the null agent that does nothing.  
￿  a(x,y).A is the input on the channel a to be 
bind to x and y, and then behave like agent 
A. Note that y is place holder for a digital 
signature. 
￿  a(x,y).A is the output that put x and y on 
the channel a and then behaves like A. 
Note that y may be a digital signature.  
￿  A || B is the parallel composition. 
￿  rec(X).A is the recursion to allow infinite 
call to the task accomplished by an agent. 
This expression binds free occurrences of X 
in A. 
 
 
2.2 Operational Semantics 
 
The operational semantics is explained below. Note 
that not all the symbols are there.  
 
τ τ τ τ        τ.A ￿ A 
Inpnro     a(x,y).A ￿ A[m/x, nro/y] ￿ a(0, nrr) ￿A 
Inp  a(x,y).A ￿ A[m/x,0/y] 
Outnro   a(m,nro).A ￿ A ￿ a(0,x).A 
Outnrr  a(m,nrr).A ￿ A 
Out  a(m).A ￿ A 
 
            A ￿ A'  
PAR 
A || B ￿ A’|| B 
 
                  A ￿A'      B ￿ B'  
COM 
                 A||B   ￿  A'||B' 
 
In the following we comment on these rules and how 
they should be interpreted. 
 
The Input Rule with an NRO (Inpnro) 
This action is responsible for the guarantee of non 
repudiation of receipt and is actually formed in the 
following steps: 
￿  Get action from the channel, which receive 
all the input in this case two parameters. 
￿  The input parameters are substituted in their 
place holder, i.e. x and y respectively 
￿  An output action is generated automatically 
on  the  same  channel  with  the  first 
parameter empty and the second parameter 
is the nrr of the recipient. 
￿  The agent A will, then, continue performing 
his duties. 
 
It  should  be  noted  that  the  rule  is  circular-free 
because once the originator receive the NRR he will 
not trigger another NRR for the recipient. Of course, 
the originator is able to see that the non-repudiation 
service received is a response of his earlier NRO. 
 
It will be noticed from the definition of this rule is 
that we adopt a style of an early semantics where the 
substitutions  occurs  once  they  have  been  received 
and  then  the  process  evolves  to  another  state 
contrary to a late semantics one.  
 
The Input Rule without an NRO (Inp) 
This  rule  is  needed  if  non-repudiation  is  a  not  a 
must.  This  case  may  be  of  interest  in  a  normal 
 
a,b … x,y,z …   Names N 
T, U, V     TTP agents T 
no, nr, con, sub  digital signatures D 
A, B ::= Agents  A 
0(null) 
|a(x,y).A    (input) 
|a(x,y).A    (output) 
|  A || B   (parallel composition) 
              | rec(X).A (recursion) 
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communication between agents or where the NRO 
and NRR are not required. 
 
In this action the second parameter is empty. Once 
the  recipient  detect  that  the  second  parameter  is 
empty there is no need to continue, but rather it is 
obligatory  to  stop,  with  his  non-repudiation 
activities. 
  
The Output Rule with NRO (Outnro) 
The  rule  is  for  initiating  a  non-repudiation 
handshake. The originator starts by forming his nro 
and sent it to the recipient. As the rule suggests the 
originator has to wait on the same channel to get his 
nrr. It should be noted that this channel will not be 
used for other communication activities while it is in 
this status. 
 
The Output Rule with NRR (Outnrr) 
The  rule  is  for  responding  to  a  received  NRO.  It 
should  be  noted  that  this  rule  is  triggered 
automatically after  an  input  has been  made  which 
contains an NRO  
 
The Output Rule without NRO or NRR (Out) 
This  rule  allows  an  agent  to  perform  regular 
communication with another agent where there is no 
need  for  non-repudiation  services.  It  is  the 
symmetric counterpart of the Inp rule without non-
repudiation services. 
 
The parallel Rule (PAR)  
This rule defines the behaviour of the parallel action 
and it is self-explanatory. 
 
The Communication Rule (COM) 
This  is  the  main  communication  between  agents 
running in parallel and willing to communicate on a 
common  channel.  Note  that  the  agents  can 
communicate  using  non-repudiation  services  or 
without them, that is, in a regular communication.  
 
2.4 Bisimulation 
 
In this subsection we define a bisimulation method 
between  processes.  The  purpose  is  to  be  able  to 
make  judgment  whether  two  processes  are 
equivalent. This result will be useful, for instance, to 
verify that an implementation meets its specification. 
 
Two agents A and B are bisimular is that for each 
transition from A to be matched by a transition from 
B  and  vice-versa,  leading  again  to  equivalent 
derivatives A’ and B’. 
As it has been stated earlier in the calculus rules that 
we  adopted  an  early  semantics,  therefore,  in  the 
definition  of  the  bisimulation  we  use  an  early 
bisimulation  style.  A  binary  symmetric  process 
relation S is bisimulation if (A,B) e S implies: 
 
(i)  if A ￿ A' with an input action a(x,y) 
then for all (z,p) ∃ B’: B ￿ B' with the 
input action a(x,y) and (A'[z/x],B'[p/y]) 
ε S 
(ii)  (ii) if A ￿ A' with an action different 
from an input then ∃ B’: B ￿ B' and 
(A',B') ε S 
 
A and B are bisimular written A ~ B if (A,B) e S for 
some bisimulation S. 
 
3. Example 
 
In  order  to  illustrate  the  calculus  in  practice  we 
specify the optimistic protocol of Zhou [9] (Zhou, 
1996). We follow the usual routine in this type of 
formalism. That is, we provide a specification of the 
protocol and an implementation. All this encoding is 
in the calculus.  The final step is to proof that the 
implementation and the specification are bisimular. 
If  this  case  holds  we  conclude  that  the  protocol 
indeed guarantees non-repudiation properties.    
 
3.1 Protocol Description 
 
The main idea of the protocol is to minimise the use 
of the TTP. For that the originator starts by making a 
commitment to the recipient by sending the message 
encrypted. Note, however, that the key is not sent 
with the message. The  originator, then, lodges the 
key with the TTP. Part of the non-repudiation is that 
the recipient must retrieve the key from the TTP and 
the  originator,  as  well,  has  to  get  a  confirmation 
from the TTP about the key. Hence the originator 
must retrieve this confirmation from the TTP.   
 
3.2 Protocol Diagram and its Standard Notation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The protocol in standard notation is as follows: 
Message 1. A ￿ B:   f_EOO,B,L,C,EOO 
Message 2. B ￿ A:   f_EOR,A,L,EOR 
 TTP 
  A    B 
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Message 3. A￿TTP:   f_SUB,B,L,K,SUB_K 
Message 4. B ￿ TTP:   f_CON,A,B,L,K,CON_K 
Message 5. A ￿ TTP:   f_CON,A,B,L,K,CON_K 
 
3.3 Protocol Encoding 
 
We map each send and receive between two agents 
as  one  process.  That  is,  between  A  and  B  and 
between  any agent (A,  B) and  the  TTP.  We  have 
four processes in total, which should be performed 
in sequential order. 
 
ZhouProtocImp = A1.A2.A3.A4 
Where: 
A1 = a(m,no).A  || a(x,y).B 
A2 = a(m,sub).A || a(x,y).T 
A3 = a(m,con).T || a(x,y).B 
A4 = a(m,con).T || a(x,y).A 
 
On the other hand we need a specification for the 
protocol which we leave as a future work. The final 
task then is to show that ZhouProtocImpl is bisimilar 
to ZhouProtocSpec. 
 
4. Related Work 
 
It should be noted that Schneider [10] has used CSP 
for  the  analysis  of  the  above  protocol  where  the 
proof has been made by hand.  
 
Kremer [11] verified non-repudiation, with a TTP, 
using a game based model that uses the model of 
alternating transition systems (ATS) and alternating 
time temporal logic (ATL) [12].  
 
Zhou work on non repudiation also uses a TTP in his 
protocols and uses belief logic SVO [13] to verify 
non-repudiation protocols. 
 
Formal analyses have been also used by Shmatikov 
[14] and [15] to study fair exchange protocols.  
 
Zhang [16] uses labelled colored Petri nets to model 
and analyse non repudiation services in a distributed 
system. 
  
5. Conclusion 
 
We have described a calculus that is useful in the 
description of non-repudiation protocols. Its syntax 
and operational semantics have been described.  
 
As  a  future  work,  we  intend  to  complete  the 
verification of Zhou optimistic protocol stated in the 
example.  Another  area  of  investigation  is  an 
implementation of this calculus in  order to take it 
from  a  paper  and  a  pencil  work  to  machine 
automation. To this end, a tool will be useful, in that, 
given  a  protocol  description,  will  decide  if  the 
protocol is satisfying non-repudiation properties or 
not. 
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